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501 
A Tale of Two Jurisdictions 
Alan M. Trammell* 
The Supreme Court has recently clarified one corner of personal 
jurisdiction—a court’s power to hale a defendant into court—and pointed the 
way toward a coherent theory of the rest of the doctrine. For nearly seventy years, 
the Court has embraced two theories of when jurisdiction over a defendant is 
permissible. The traditional theory, general jurisdiction, authorizes jurisdiction 
when there is a tight connection between the defendant and the forum. The 
modern theory, specific jurisdiction, focuses more on the connection between the 
lawsuit itself and the forum. Although the two theories should have developed 
in tandem, the doctrine has become a morass. 
This Article makes three contributions. First, it elucidates the unsettling 
disjunction that has developed between general and specific jurisdiction. 
Second, from a doctrinal perspective, it demonstrates that the Court has 
severely constrained the reach of general jurisdiction in a way that would have 
been surprising just four years ago. In all likelihood, a corporation is subject to 
general jurisdiction only in its state of incorporation and where it maintains its 
principal place of business. This doctrinal development sensibly has restricted 
general jurisdiction to what I call the saturation point—the place (or very 
limited number of places) where a defendant cannot have more significant 
contacts anywhere else. Third, it posits that the concept of a saturation point for 
general jurisdiction logically suggests a saturation point for specific 
jurisdiction—that is, a place where the lawsuit itself could not have more 
significant ties to any other forum. The latter saturation point winds up being 
more of a thought experiment, but one that bookends a coherent vision of the 
entire doctrine. The constitutional test for the exercise of jurisdiction at either 
saturation point is exceedingly demanding, but personal jurisdiction can exist 
along a continuum. Between the two saturation points, when a particular forum 
has some connection to both the defendant and also the lawsuit, the 
constitutional test is quite lax. In other words, the notion of saturation points 
 
 *  Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Derek Bambauer, Jane 
Bambauer, Emily Berman, Pamela Bookman, Robin Effron, Heather Elliott, Claudia Haupt, Brian 
Lee, Dave Marcus, Roger Michalski, Henry Monaghan, Melissa Mortazavi, James Nelson, Alex 
Raskolnikov, Laurent Sacharoff, Nelson Tebbe, Ryan Williams, and Maggie Wittlin, as well as the 
participants in the Seventh Annual Junior Federal Courts Workshop, for their generous comments 
and suggestions. 
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and the continuum between them can sensibly integrate the two forms of 
personal jurisdiction, which until now have had an uneasy relationship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For those of us who are strangely enamored of the nuances of 
personal jurisdiction, the last four years have been the best of times and 
the worst of times, an age of wisdom and an age of foolishness.1 On the 
one hand, the Supreme Court has clarified general jurisdiction, which 
gives a court power over a defendant in any lawsuit, even one that has 
no connection to the forum. For decades, general jurisdiction had 
languished with scant and unsatisfying attention from the Court. But 
in 2011 and 2014, the Court spoke with a nearly unanimous voice in 
two cases to define that form of personal jurisdiction with remarkable 
precision.2 On the other hand, important aspects of specific jurisdiction 
remain mired in confusing and fractured jurisprudence. That species of 
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant when the lawsuit itself 
is closely connected to the forum. Despite the promise of greater clarity 
in 2011, the Court yet again failed to muster even a majority opinion.3 
 
 1.  See CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 3 (Washington Square Press 1973) (1859). 
 2.  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (eight-Justice majority); Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (unanimous). 
 3.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (four-Justice plurality). 
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This Article has three goals. First, it demonstrates that general 
and specific jurisdiction have had an uneasy relationship from the 
beginning and have conspired to generate an illogical and unpredictable 
jurisprudence. Second, it shows that the Supreme Court has 
significantly reined in general jurisdiction to an extent that would have 
been surprising just four years ago. In so doing, it brought theoretical 
cohesion to that aspect of personal jurisdiction. Third, this Article 
argues that the Court’s recent general jurisdiction case law points 
toward a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction, grounded in the 
notion that due process protects parties against the arbitrary exercise 
of judicial power. In so doing, the latent theory within the recent case 
law offers a way to resolve the long-festering disjunction between 
general and specific jurisdiction. 
Part II elucidates the disjunction. General jurisdiction was 
rooted in distinctly territorial notions of judicial power. As people and 
businesses became less geographically concentrated, a territorial 
approach to jurisdiction often led to bizarre results and, in turn, a series 
of legal fictions that attempted to correct the worst injustices. Specific 
jurisdiction aspired to scuttle those fictions and create a pragmatic and 
flexible basis for jurisdiction. It focused on the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction in any given place and, in particular, whether the lawsuit 
itself bore an acceptable relationship to the forum. If all had proceeded 
according to plan, specific jurisdiction would have become the primary 
way to hale defendants into court. But that didn’t happen. The Supreme 
Court erected significant barriers to the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 
To fill the resulting jurisdictional gaps, lower courts often took 
advantage of the Supreme Court’s sparse edicts on general jurisdiction 
and pressed that doctrine into service in expansive and unpredictable 
ways. But most of those ad hoc developments were untethered to any 
sound theory of jurisdiction. Consequently, the two species of personal 
jurisdiction have never been truly complementary. 
Part III argues that the Supreme Court has tightened the 
concept of general jurisdiction to an extent that, until quite recently, 
would have been unfathomable. In so doing, the Court provided 
theoretical cohesion to this aspect of the jurisdictional calculus. In 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown4 and Daimler AG v. 
Bauman,5 the Court made plain that many lower courts’ expansive 
approaches to general jurisdiction over corporations were improper. 
Instead, a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only where 
 
 4.  131 S. Ct. 2846. 
 5.  134 S. Ct. 746. 
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it is “at home,”6 and the paradigm of being at home is when a 
corporation has incorporated in a state or maintains its principal place 
of business there.7 But could a corporation be at home somewhere else? 
It’s possible, suggested the Court, but highly improbable.8 Those 
answers represented a sea change in general jurisdiction, and Daimler 
signaled that there is almost no play in the joints. 
Part IV demonstrates that the near unanimity regarding 
general jurisdiction sheds light on how to resolve the Court’s seemingly 
insuperable divisions regarding specific jurisdiction. General 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are not binary. Instead, they 
simply are terms that describe different points along a constitutional 
continuum. Within the new general jurisdiction case law lies the germ 
of a coherent theory, one that has eluded the Supreme Court for decades 
but can offer a unifying vision of personal jurisdiction. 
The seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 
essentially recognized two relationships that exist along different axes 
and define the personal jurisdiction continuum—first, the connection 
between the defendant and the forum; second, the connection between 
the lawsuit and the forum. If my conclusion in Part II is correct, the 
Supreme Court has held that when there is no relationship between the 
lawsuit and the forum, general jurisdiction is constitutionally 
permissible only at what I call the saturation point. What I mean by 
this is the place (or limited number of places) where the defendant has 
so many contacts that there is no other state or country with which the 
defendant has more significant contacts. Restricting general 
jurisdiction to the saturation point vindicates a vision of due process 
that protects parties against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power. 
This idea of a saturation point along one axis—the relationship 
between the defendant and the forum—suggests that there is a 
saturation point along the other. Courts and scholars have not explicitly 
entertained or explored this concept. In theory, though, there is a point 
at which the connection between a lawsuit and the forum is so strong 
that the assertion of personal jurisdiction is permissible even if the 
defendant has no connection to the forum. This saturation point is more 
 
 6.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 760–62; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2854, 2857; see also 
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 
531–32 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear’s “at home” formulation articulated a necessary, not merely 
sufficient, condition for proper exercise of general jurisdiction). 
 7.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
 8.  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54; see also PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF 
THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures/Jerry Bruckheimer Films 2003) (Barbossa, upon seeing 
Jack Sparrow alive: “It’s not possible.” / Sparrow: “Not probable.”). But don’t see PIRATES OF THE 
CARIBBEAN: ON STRANGER TIDES (Walt Disney Pictures/Jerry Bruckheimer Films 2011). 
 9.  326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/11/2015  7:19 PM 
2015] TALE OF TWO JURISDICTIONS 505 
theoretical than real. It is conceptually useful, however, because it 
identifies the other outer constitutional boundary for personal 
jurisdiction. Together, these saturation points suggest a lucid theory of 
jurisdiction based on the concept of nonarbitrariness. 
Most cases will not implicate the extreme of either saturation 
point. They will involve at least some connection between the defendant 
and the forum as well as some connection between the lawsuit and the 
forum. That vast middle ground is an area in which the 
nonarbitrariness principle requires neither relationship to be as strong 
as it is at either saturation point. The fallacy committed by a plurality 
(and perhaps a majority) of the Supreme Court has involved taking the 
stringent standards that govern the extremes and applying them to the 
middle. In fact, the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction in this 
middle ground is far more forgiving than current jurisprudence 
suggests. 
Although Goodyear and Daimler brought considerable 
theoretical cohesion to general jurisdiction, a practical problem looms. 
Under the Court’s current case law, general jurisdiction is now 
appropriately narrow, but specific jurisdiction has remained 
inappropriately limited. The result is an even larger jurisdictional 
lacuna than the one that had developed insidiously over the last several 
decades. 
The gap need not exist. Because the Constitution imposes 
exacting standards at the saturation points, but very few restraints in 
most other cases, the theory developed here would work a vast 
expansion of specific jurisdiction and significantly alter current 
doctrine. But this reconceptualization of the doctrine also reveals a wide 
berth for Congress and the Court to craft prudential restraints on 
courts’ adjudicative power. In so doing, those institutions can address 
subconstitutional concerns about convenience, predictability, and 
fairness. This potentially productive dialogue between the legislature 
and the judiciary cannot happen, though, until the Supreme Court 
finally differentiates between the truly constitutional and the merely 
prudential restraints that govern personal jurisdiction. 
II. THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC AND GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Until relatively recently, personal jurisdiction was grounded in 
territorial theories of judicial power. The centuries-old idea found 
expression in the canonical case of Pennoyer v. Neff: “[E]very State 
4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/11/2015  7:19 PM 
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possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory.”10 
As courts began to realize that old theories were not up to the 
challenges presented by a less geographically concentrated society, they 
developed a modern, pragmatic theory of personal jurisdiction. 
Although the pragmatic theory should have done most of the heavy 
lifting in fashioning a new approach fit for twentieth-century realities, 
its reach became oddly circumscribed. The old and new theories never 
meshed as early commentators had hoped, and a long-festering 
disjunction has ensued. 
A. The Rise and Unfulfilled Promise of Specific Jurisdiction 
Major developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries—primarily the growth of corporations and the increased 
mobility of individuals—put stress on the formalism of the old 
territorial approach to personal jurisdiction.11 As corporations 
expanded operations beyond state borders, the likelihood that they 
might cause harm outside of their home states increased dramatically. 
Courts responded along two different dimensions, even though at the 
time they did not conceptualize their responses in that way. In fact, the 
jurisprudence initially was something of a hodgepodge.12 
One response essentially tried to fit corporations into the old 
territorial paradigm. If an individual was amenable to personal 
jurisdiction in her domicile, what was the equivalent place for a 
corporation? This approach speaks to the central concept underlying 
general jurisdiction—discerning where a defendant (whether an 
individual or an entity) is amenable to jurisdiction for any lawsuit. 
Professor Twitchell aptly termed this form of jurisdiction “dispute-
blind,” insofar as it is indifferent to any connection between the dispute 
itself and the forum.13 In the process of trying to determine the 
corporate equivalent of domicile, courts invoked a number of 
metaphors, attempting to suss out where a corporation was “present” 
or actually “doing business.”14 As courts grappled with those somewhat 
 
 10.  95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
 11.  See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 620–21 
(1988); Stein, supra note 6, at 534. Before then, the formalisms were far less problematic, mainly 
because most disputes were localized. See Twitchell, supra, at 615. 
 12.  See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of 
General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 974 (2012). 
 13.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 613. 
 14.  See id. at 621–22; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 973. 
4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/11/2015  7:19 PM 
2015] TALE OF TWO JURISDICTIONS 507 
metaphysical questions,15 they reached results that often defied 
consistency and sound theory.16 
The other response to this dilemma was the rise of what has 
become known as specific jurisdiction. It was dispute-specific, focusing 
on where the dispute itself (rather than the defendant) was based.17 
While courts had experimented along these lines for several decades, 
International Shoe revolutionized the jurisdictional landscape by 
candidly introducing a dispute-specific theory.18 It began to 
differentiate the concepts that Professors von Mehren and Trautman 
later gave the now-familiar monikers of specific and general personal 
jurisdiction.19 International Shoe dispensed with the idea that dispute-
specific jurisdiction turned on old metaphors of “presence”20 and 
“consent.”21 Instead, when a lawsuit “arise[s] out of or [is] connected 
with the [corporation’s] activities within the state,” due process allows 
that state to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation.22 The analysis 
thus no longer relies on old formalisms but rather on a defendant’s 
contacts with the forum and the reasonableness of asserting 
jurisdiction.23 
Commentators believed that general jurisdiction would 
diminish in importance as the Supreme Court embraced a more robust 
role for specific jurisdiction.24 But the doctrine didn’t develop that way. 
Despite a willingness to decide a range of specific jurisdiction cases over 
the ensuing decades,25 the Court did not clearly define exactly what 
 
 15.  Professor Stein calls it a “category mistake” to ask whether a corporation is physically 
present in a state at the time of service of process. Stein, supra note 6, at 535. 
 16.  See Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 972–75. 
 17.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 611, 613. 
 18.  See id. at 623–25. Before International Shoe, courts experimenting with dispute-specific 
jurisdiction had couched their analysis in the old nomenclature. One such legal fiction was the 
idea of “implied consent.” See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
 19.  See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
 20.  See 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (describing “presence” as a conclusion rather than a 
mode of analysis); see also Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 779 (referring to the Supreme Court’s 
disapproval of the “presence” test); Stein, supra note 6, at 535 (referring to “presence” analysis as 
a “category mistake”); Twitchell, supra note 11, at 624 (“[International Shoe] held that the 
‘presence’ formulation begged the question . . . .”). 
 21.  See 326 U.S. at 318–19 (similarly treating “consent” in dispute-specific contexts as a 
“fiction”). 
 22.  Id. at 319. 
 23.  See id. at 316–17. 
 24.  See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144, 1164; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 
628, 676. 
 25.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (noting that 
the “Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of 
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kind of relationship must exist between the lawsuit and the forum in 
order for specific jurisdiction to be proper.26 More significantly, the 
Court placed significant constraints on its scope.27 
The essential test for specific jurisdiction, as decades of civil 
procedure students have learned, is whether the defendant has “certain 
minimum contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’ ”28 This two-prong test—minimum contacts and basic fairness—
still serves as the backbone of specific jurisdiction analyses. Other 
commentators have ably recounted the doctrinal permutations and 
complexities that have since developed.29 For present purposes, though, 
it suffices to note just some of the most prominent ways in which the 
Court has cabined specific jurisdiction. 
Since International Shoe, the Court’s specific jurisdiction case 
law has focused almost entirely on the defendant. While the doctrine 
nominally considers the possible inconvenience to a plaintiff if the 
lawsuit were relocated to a different forum,30 it overwhelmingly treats 
a defendant’s inconvenience as paramount in the jurisdictional 
calculus. At one point, the Court asserted that one of the primary 
purposes of the minimum contacts prong was to “protect[ ] the 
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient 
forum.”31 It has also treated inconvenience to defendants within the 
fairness prong of the analysis.32 Exactly what degree of inconvenience 
 
specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving ‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having 
their impact within the forum State”). 
 26.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 629–30, 633, 637; see also Brilmayer et al., A General 
Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 727–28. 
 27.  See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
119, 130–32; Stein, supra note 6, at 542. 
 28.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 
463 (1940)). 
 29.  For particularly good overviews of the major cases since International Shoe, see Patrick 
J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to 
Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 56–78 (1990), and William M. Richman, 
Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 599–637 (1993). Professor Effron also 
offers a nice overview and a very useful discussion of the Court’s 2011 personal jurisdiction 
decisions. See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness 
Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 872–91 (2012). 
 30.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting 
that plaintiff’s forum choice is a relevant consideration under International Shoe’s fairness prong); 
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (same). 
 31.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
 32.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (majority 
opinion) (noting that fairness factors include consideration of “the burden on the defendant” and 
that “the burden on the defendant in this case is severe”). 
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presents constitutional concerns remains somewhat murky;33 
nonetheless, inconvenience to the defendant remains a central feature 
of the specific jurisdiction analysis.34 
Perhaps the most conspicuous way in which the Court has 
adopted a defendant-centric focus is through its refinement of the 
minimum-contacts prong. It is not enough that the defendant simply 
have a meaningful contact with the forum (for example, if the 
defendant’s product causes harm in the forum state). Rather, the 
contact must result from the defendant’s “purposeful availment” of the 
forum’s benefits and protections.35 Thus, if a local automobile retailer 
sells a car in New York, the purchaser drives the car across the country, 
and the car becomes involved in an accident in Oklahoma, the retailer 
is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.36 Why? Although 
there is a meaningful contact with Oklahoma (the car sold by the 
defendant caused harm there), the contact did not result from the 
defendant’s purposeful association with the forum. Instead, the car 
wound up in Oklahoma through the plaintiff’s “unilateral activity.”37 
This insistence on the defendant’s intentional contact with the forum 
proves especially vexing when a product has moved through an 
extensive distribution chain. The Court continues to express skepticism 
that a manufacturer, simply by placing its product into the stream of 
commerce, has demonstrated sufficient purposeful contacts with states 
and countries along the distribution chain.38 
The test for specific jurisdiction thus has become increasingly 
demanding.39 Although this modern theory of personal jurisdiction—
with its focus on contacts and reasonableness—was supposed to become 
 
 33.  Compare id. at 114 (noting unconstitutional inconvenience of compelling a Japanese 
manufacturer to travel to California and litigate in a foreign judicial system), with Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483–84 (1985) (holding that inconvenience experienced by a 
Michigan franchisee in traveling to Florida to try case was not “so substantial as to achieve 
constitutional magnitude” (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))). 
 34.  Many scholars have roundly criticized this development. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 627 (2006) (arguing that 
“the constitutionalization of convenience turns out to be one of the greatest flaws of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine as currently conceived”); see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing “that 
the convenience rationale is, at a minimum, severely overstated”).  
 35.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 36.  See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–91. 
 37.  Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). 
 38.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) 
(“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality opinion) (noting that placement of product into stream of 
commerce does not demonstrate that defendant has “targeted the forum”). 
 39.  See Borchers, supra note 27, at 130–32; Stein, supra note 6, at 542. 
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the dominant mode of analysis, it actually created severe jurisdictional 
gaps. But general jurisdiction remained alive and well. In fact, because 
of the Supreme Court’s crabbed approach to specific jurisdiction, 
general jurisdiction still played an outsize role, but with only limited 
and vague guidance from the Court. 
B. The Persistence of General Jurisdiction 
International Shoe recognized the continuing salience of true 
general jurisdiction, in the sense that such jurisdiction is dispute-
blind.40 There was widespread agreement that a corporation would be 
subject to general jurisdiction at least at its “home bases”—its place of 
incorporation and its principal place of business.41 But how much 
further it might extend remained unclear initially. During the next 
sixty-six years, the Supreme Court decided only two general jurisdiction 
cases. Because both seemed so easy on their facts, they offered only 
limited guidance to lower courts. 
The first, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., involved 
a suit in Ohio against a foreign mining corporation.42 Although the 
defendant’s mining operations were centered almost entirely in the 
Philippines, those operations had ceased during the Japanese 
occupation of the Philippines in World War II. The company’s president 
and general manager returned to his home in Ohio and managed the 
corporation’s activities from there for the remainder of the war.43 The 
Supreme Court held that Ohio could exercise general jurisdiction over 
the defendant.44 As scholars and courts have recognized, the case 
comfortably fit into the traditional conception of general jurisdiction 
because the company effectively had relocated its principal place of 
business, albeit temporarily, to Ohio.45 
The second case, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall (“Helicol”),46 presented an easy example at the other end of the 
 
 40.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
 41.  See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1141–42; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 
633; see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 735. 
 42.  342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952). 
 43.  Id. at 447–48. 
 44.  See id. at 448. 
 45.  See, e.g., Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 734; Todd David Peterson, The Timing of 
Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 213 (2011); von 
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144; see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal 
Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 566–
67 (2012) (describing Perkins as presenting “extreme facts” and noting the Supreme Court’s later 
characterization that Ohio had become defendant’s “de facto principal place of business”). 
 46.  466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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spectrum. The defendant had no physical operations in Texas. Its only 
contacts with the forum included sending its CEO to Texas for one 
contract negotiation, purchasing goods and services from Texas, 
sending personnel to Texas for occasional training, and drawing money 
from a Houston bank into its own account in New York.47 Although such 
contacts clearly would have been sufficient for any action arising out of 
them,48 the Court had little trouble concluding that they fell far short 
of the standard for general jurisdiction. Notably, the Court contrasted 
the case with Perkins, but it offered no real clues about how to analyze 
cases that fell into the vast expanse between Helicol and Perkins.49 
In theory, the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court 
regarding general jurisdiction should not have mattered that much. But 
general jurisdiction retained an oddly prominent place because of the 
confluence of two factors. First, as discussed above, the promise of a 
broad and flexible doctrine of specific jurisdiction never came to full 
fruition. Second, the Supreme Court offered only limited guidance on 
the appropriate standards for general jurisdiction and indicated a basic 
unwillingness to police its bounds. Lower courts largely embraced the 
opportunity to give the doctrine a wide reading. Consequently, general 
jurisdiction often provided a surer grounding for haling defendants into 
court, and it served to fill jurisdictional gaps left by the Supreme Court’s 
often hidebound approach to specific jurisdiction.50 
Lower courts’ tests for general jurisdiction often were quite lax 
and, even more frequently, bereft of any sound theoretical justification. 
A number of courts continued to invoke the old pre–International Shoe 
metaphors of “presence” and “doing business.”51 They usually insisted 
on a showing of direct sales into the forum and a fairly minimal physical 
presence there.52 Despite the fact that those metaphors originally had 
sought to capture the corporate equivalent of an individual’s domicile,53 
courts often applied such tests in a way that exposed some defendants 
to general jurisdiction even when those defendants manifested none of 
the “traditional indicia of such jurisdiction—a home base, an agent for 
 
 47.  Id. at 416. 
 48.  Twitchell, supra note 11, at 639–40. 
 49.  See Helicol, 466 U.S. at 414–16. 
 50.  Borchers, supra note 27, at 130–32; Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with 
Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 196–97; see also Meier Feder, Goodyear, 
“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 680–81 
(2012) (noting ubiquity of “doing business” approach to general jurisdiction). 
 51.  Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 981–82; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 635–36. 
 52.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 680 n.20. 
 53.  See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
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service of process, [or] a local office.”54 In other words, the “doing 
business” test encompassed far more than a corporation’s principal 
place of business and could include almost any place where a 
corporation engaged in regular business activities.55 As a result, the old 
metaphors had strayed far from their intended goal. Moreover, their 
continued vitality was perplexing in light of International Shoe’s 
admonition that such metaphors were mere conclusions rather than 
actual modes of analysis.56 
Other courts set the bar even lower, holding that defendants 
could be subject to general jurisdiction based only on a high volume of 
sales in the forum (despite a lack of physical presence there).57 Such an 
approach has proved especially controversial when courts assert 
general jurisdiction based only on the availability of a defendant’s 
website and a certain volume of Internet sales into the forum.58 
Professor Pielemeier has argued that perhaps the most frustrating 
approach involved tallying the defendant’s contacts with the state and 
then simply announcing whether they were sufficient to justify general 
jurisdiction.59 
Even courts that insisted on a higher showing—say, requiring 
that the defendant have some physical presence, such as a small 
office60—failed to offer a sound theoretical justification for why such a 
minimal connection to the forum should make the defendant 
answerable for any and every lawsuit there. General jurisdiction was 
filling some of the gaps left by the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law 
but in a haphazard and unpredictable way. The disjunction between the 
two thus persisted. By the time the Supreme Court decided Goodyear, 
general jurisdiction had become a “theoretical wasteland.”61 
 
 54.  Twitchell, supra note 11, at 635. 
 55.  See id. at 633–36. 
 56.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); see also Pielemeier, supra 
note 12, at 982. 
 57.  See Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–14 (describing courts’ “general assumption” that 
extensive direct sales could lead to general jurisdiction); Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 983 
(describing this as the minority position); see also Borchers, supra note 27, at 127–29 (noting that 
“no clear answer exists” whether a certain volume of direct sales can lead to general jurisdiction).  
 58.  See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1076–80 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 509–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Allan R. 
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory 
Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 436–41 (2004) (characterizing Gator.com and Gorman as the 
exceptions to the rule that courts have “resisted finding general jurisdiction based solely on 
defendant’s maintenance of a web site accessible from the forum”). 
 59.  Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 983. 
 60.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 634 (noting that courts were more likely to find general 
jurisdiction appropriate when defendant engaged in physical activity within state borders). 
 61.  Feder, supra note 50, at 684. 
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III. “AT HOME”: CONSTRICTING THE SCOPE OF GENERAL JURISDICTION 
A. Goodyear and its Aftermath 
Twenty-seven years after its last decision on general 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in Goodyear, 
which concerned a bus accident in France in which two North Carolina 
boys died.62 The boys’ parents sued an American corporation and three 
of its foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina state court, alleging that 
faulty tires caused the accident.63 Although the parent company, 
Goodyear USA, did not contest jurisdiction in the North Carolina 
courts, the three subsidiaries did.64 Yet again, the general jurisdiction 
question seemed straightforward. As the Supreme Court noted, the 
subsidiaries were “not registered to do business in North Carolina”; had 
“no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina”; 
and did “not solicit business in North Carolina.”65 
In one sense, the Supreme Court expeditiously corrected a 
convoluted—perhaps even specious66—jurisdictional analysis by the 
North Carolina courts. (The state courts had imported the stream-of-
commerce theory, which might establish specific jurisdiction over a 
defendant, into the general jurisdiction analysis.67) But in a lucid 
opinion by Justice Ginsburg on behalf of a unanimous Court, Goodyear 
accomplished far more than mere error correction. 
The opinion was a masterstroke. It cleaned up old (and 
occasionally misleading) metaphors, loose language, and convoluted 
opinions. It managed to reconcile the holdings of the Supreme Court’s 
cases yet also convey unmistakably that the lower courts had been far 
too indulgent in finding general jurisdiction. Moreover, it introduced 
the phrase “at home,” which succinctly captures the essence of general 
jurisdiction and became the lodestar by which lower courts should 
reorient their analysis. 
 
 62.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
 63.  Id. The three subsidiaries were based in Turkey, Luxembourg, and France. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 2852. The defendants’ only connection with North Carolina was the limited 
distribution of some of their tires there. But none of the tires distributed in North Carolina 
included the models that were on the bus in question. Id. 
 66.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 530 (“If a first-year law student had written that answer on 
my Civil Procedure final exam, I would have had a hard time giving it a passing grade.”).  
 67.  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854–56. In the specific jurisdiction context, the stream-of-
commerce metaphor can permit courts to assert jurisdiction when a defendant’s product moves 
through an extensive distribution chain and causes harm to the end consumer in the forum. To 
the extent that jurisdiction is permissible, though, it extends only to lawsuits that arise directly 
from the harm that the product causes in the forum. See id. at 2855–56. 
4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/11/2015  7:19 PM 
514 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2:501 
The first problem to which Goodyear attended was the 
shorthand phrases that lower courts had used as the tests for specific 
and general jurisdiction. As noted above, International Shoe contained 
the kernel of this idea.68 Although that opinion made great strides in 
many respects, it did not articulate a fully formed theory to differentiate 
the two species of personal jurisdiction.69 To fault it for not having 
anticipated these nuances would be unfair, but some of its phrases 
wound up having an insidious influence on the development of the case 
law. When articulating the concept of general jurisdiction, for instance, 
International Shoe said that general jurisdiction could be permissible 
when a defendant’s “continuous corporate operations” are “so 
substantial and of such a nature” as to justify jurisdiction over the 
defendant regarding any lawsuit.70 By contrast, specific jurisdiction is 
appropriate when a corporation’s forum activities are “continuous and 
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on.”71 
Subsequent cases truncated and inverted those phrases. The 
Court’s general jurisdiction analysis in Perkins, for example, asked 
simply whether the defendant had engaged in “continuous and 
systematic corporate activities” in the forum.72 Helicol then enshrined 
the “continuous and systematic” phrase as the test for general 
jurisdiction.73 Divorced from the rest of the qualifying language in 
International Shoe, the “continuous and systematic” language had 
created a deceptively low bar for asserting general jurisdiction. 
Goodyear never explicitly called out the mischief that the shorthand 
phrase had caused. But Justice Ginsburg’s opinion took pains to 
reintroduce International Shoe’s contextualizing language, both for 
specific and general jurisdiction.74 
In reorienting the analysis, Goodyear made three important 
moves. First, it identified a corporation’s principal place of business and 
 
 68.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945). 
 69.  The nomenclature owes to Professors von Mehren and Trautman. See generally von 
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19 (describing specific and general jurisdiction). 
 70.  International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added). 
 71.  Id. at 317 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court went on to make clear that “continuous 
and systematic” activities were not necessary in the specific jurisdiction context. Id. at 318. It was 
a factual description of International Shoe’s activities in Washington. The key for specific 
jurisdiction is whether the contacts, however limited, give rise to the lawsuit. See id. 
 72.  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). Although Perkins had 
substituted the “continuous and systematic” phrase from International Shoe’s description of 
specific jurisdiction for the “continuous and substantial” phrase, it is not clear that that 
transposition is meaningful. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 767 n.6 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring in judgment). 
 73.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); see also 
Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 979–80; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 675. 
 74.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011). 
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its place of incorporation as the paradigms of where general jurisdiction 
would be appropriate.75 Second, it made clear that Perkins is the 
“textbook case” of when general jurisdiction is permissible outside of the 
paradigms.76 In so doing, Goodyear underscored that the relationship 
between the defendant and the forum in Perkins was not simply 
substantial but that, in fact, the forum effectively had become the 
defendant’s principal place of business during World War II.77 Finally, 
the Court introduced a new phrase that grounded the general 
jurisdiction inquiry—whether the defendants’ contacts with the forum 
are so substantial “as to render them essentially at home” there.78 The 
Court cited the “at home” phrase twice more and used it as the standard 
for assessing whether the defendants were amenable to general 
jurisdiction in North Carolina.79 In some ways, the “continuous and 
systematic” language understandably had become a convenient 
shorthand because the International Shoe phraseology was quite a 
mouthful.80 The notion of “at home” expressed the same sentiment but 
in a pithier, more quotable way. It is a succinct distillation that 
beautifully conveys how high the bar is. 
Goodyear represented a dramatic shift. Courts81 and 
 
 75.  Id. at 2853–54. 
 76.  Id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)). 
 77.  See id.  
 78.  Id. at 2851 (emphasis added). 
 79.  See id. at 2854, 2857. 
 80.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have been instances 
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing “at home” 
standard as “stringent”); Henry A. v. Willden, No. 2:10-CV-00528-RCJ, 2014 WL 1809634, at *6 
(D. Nev. May 7, 2014) (“The Supreme Court recently twice clarified that the reach of general 
jurisdiction is narrower than had been supposed in the lower courts for many years.”); Estate of 
Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Mission Essential Pers., LLC, No. 1:11CV547, 2013 WL 6058308, 
at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2013) (construing Goodyear and stating that “the bar for determining 
general jurisdiction has been raised”); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 11-3934-CV, 2014 
WL 4629049, at *11 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2014) (recognizing that Daimler abrogated Second Circuit 
precedent on general jurisdiction); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 
224–26 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing stringency of the “at home” standard and suggesting that 
earlier New York precedent on general jurisdiction might no longer pass muster); Gilmore v. 
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., No. 1-853 (GK), 2014 WL 2865538, at *4–5 (D.D.C. June 23, 
2014) (suggesting that Goodyear’s articulation of “at home” standard was a significant doctrinal 
shift); Meyer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., No. 13 CIV. 3128 CM, 2014 WL 2039654, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (treating “at home” language in Daimler as limiting general jurisdiction 
to paradigm examples). 
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commentators82 overwhelmingly recognized that the Court had 
contracted the scope of general jurisdiction and that significant change 
was afoot. The only real question was how significant it would be.83 
A relatively safe assumption was that a corporation’s physical 
presence in the forum should be a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the exercise of general jurisdiction.84 In all likelihood, that 
requirement should put an end to some courts’ practice of exercising 
general jurisdiction based only on regular sales, including online sales, 
into the forum.85 Moreover, it is hard to imagine that a corporation with 
only a minimal physical presence in the forum will be at home there. 
Consequently, the “doing business” approach that many courts had 
adopted—albeit with amorphous standards—probably is no longer 
valid.86 
Goodyear, to my mind, was always more ambitious than that, an 
opinion that effectively restricted general jurisdiction to the paradigm 
examples (principal place of business and place of incorporation) or 
their functional equivalents (as in Perkins). Other scholars 
acknowledged that this was a plausible, if not exactly ineluctable, 
reading of Goodyear.87 Some scholars who were genuinely enthusiastic 
about Goodyear’s constriction of general jurisdiction and the level of 
clarity and coherence that it provided nonetheless resisted the idea that 
it had trimmed general jurisdiction to that extent.88 Moreover, some of 
those scholars noted that, despite Goodyear’s tremendous strides, the 
 
 82.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 527–28 (arguing that Goodyear “cast[ ] doubt over a large body 
of lower court decisions”); Feder, supra note 50, at 680; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 989–91; see 
also Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 587 (arguing that “[t]he restriction of general jurisdiction to one 
or two states would effect a radical shift”). 
 83.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 680. 
 84.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 545. 
 85.  See id.; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 989–90; see also Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–
14. 
 86.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 695 (concluding that Goodyear’s “at home” requirement 
“undermines the lower court case law that has accepted . . . doing business in a state as a sufficient 
basis for general jurisdiction”); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 (2014) 
(noting that precedent finding general jurisdiction based on “ ‘doing business’ in the 
forum . . . should not attract heavy reliance today”). 
 87.  See Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 990; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 587 
(recognizing but criticizing this possibility). Professor Pielemeier also notes that Justices Kennedy, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor entertained this possibility during oral argument. See Pielemeier, supra 
note 12, at 990. In light of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Daimler, though, the musings during 
oral argument probably merit a grain or two of salt. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 767–71 & n.9 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that general jurisdiction should not be limited to 
place of incorporation and principal place of business). 
 88.  See, e.g., Stein, supra note 6, at 547. 
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Court still would need to clarify certain remaining questions—chief 
among them the precise scope of the phrase “at home.”89 
Notwithstanding the general scholarly enthusiasm for Goodyear 
and the consensus that, at the very least, it had significantly 
constrained general jurisdiction, skeptics remained. Some scholars 
called the opinion “troubling”90 and doubted whether the Court actually 
had upended so much case law.91 They suggested that a defendant’s 
direct sales into a forum, even in the absence of any physical presence 
there, still might warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.92 
Furthermore, a minority of courts has clung to the idea that Goodyear 
left lower court jurisprudence completely undisturbed.93 In that vein, 
some courts continue to rely solely on a high volume of forum sales to 
justify asserting general jurisdiction.94 And when one court decided a 
question of general jurisdiction, it dismissed Goodyear—with literally 
no analysis—as “not on point.”95 
Although one justifiably can identify certain outstanding 
questions about the precise scope of Goodyear’s edicts on general 
jurisdiction, some of the skeptics’ arguments manufacture ambiguity 
 
 89.  See Effron, supra note 29, at 889; Stein, supra note 6, at 545–48; see also Lea Brilmayer 
& Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 619–20 (2012) 
(noting outstanding questions and arguing that “the analytic mechanisms for deciding hard cases 
remain underdeveloped”); Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 610 (posing a series of questions that 
Goodyear purportedly did not resolve). 
 90.  Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 583; see also Peterson, supra note 45, at 213 (“The problem 
with . . . Goodyear is that it could be read much more broadly than the facts of this particular case 
might suggest.”). 
 91.  See Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 551 (arguing that Goodyear “achieved consensus only 
because it can be read in radically different ways”); Peterson, supra note 45, at 217 (assailing 
“conflicting metaphors and references” that “do not lead in any clear direction”). 
 92.  See Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 576; Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–14; see also Linda 
J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comparative 
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 613 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear “is not clear” on whether 
general jurisdiction requires a defendant’s physical presence in forum). 
 93.  See, e.g., Hess v. Bumbo Int’l Trust, 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2013) 
(“Goodyear did not purport to announce new principles or change the law of personal jurisdiction; 
it applied existing principles in a modern stream-of-commerce context.”); see also J.B. ex rel. 
Benjamin v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 12-CV-385, 2013 WL 452807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013) (rejecting 
the argument that “Goodyear created a ‘new standard to govern the exercise of general jurisdiction 
over a corporation’ ”). 
 94.  See, e.g., Ruben v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Ashbury Int’l 
Grp., Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc., No. 3:11CV00079, 2012 WL 4325183 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012); 
see also McFadden v. Fuyao N. Am. Inc., No. 10-CV-14457, 2012 WL 1230046 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 
2012) (exercising general jurisdiction over defendant, which had no physical presence in forum, 
based only on business negotiations in and regular sales into that forum). 
 95.  Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704 
(N.D. Ill. 2011). But see Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank). 
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where there is none. Perhaps this is born simply of a disagreement with 
the Court’s project. No fair reading, though, can ignore the Court’s clear 
intent to shift the mode of analysis and, through the “at home” 
standard, dramatically restrain the more adventurous interpretations 
of general jurisdiction. But the persistence of certain questions—large 
and small, reasonable and unduly imaginative—necessitated another 
intervention by the Court. 
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman96 
Daimler reaffirmed the “at home” test for general jurisdiction. 
Without explicitly saying so, it also moved ever closer to the most 
restrictive interpretation of that standard. And similar to Goodyear, it 
saw the Court speak with a nearly unanimous voice through an opinion 
by Justice Ginsburg. (Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment.) 
Daimler involved allegations that Mercedes-Benz Argentina 
(“MB Argentina”), a subsidiary of the company now known as Daimler 
AG (“Daimler”), had collaborated with the Argentine government 
during the “Dirty War” of 1976–1983 and perpetrated horrific human 
rights abuses. The plaintiffs sued Daimler, a German corporation, in 
California.97 Because the lawsuit concerned events in Argentina, 
personal jurisdiction in California was appropriate only if Daimler 
could be subject to general jurisdiction there. The plaintiffs contended 
that another Daimler subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 
(“MBUSA”), had sufficient contacts with California to be amenable to 
general jurisdiction there and that those contacts were imputable to 
Daimler, MBUSA’s parent. In other words, they contended that 
MBUSA was “Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”98 
The Supreme Court rejected the assertion of general jurisdiction 
over Daimler on two grounds. First, it dispensed with the agency 
argument in a mere three paragraphs.99 Second, and far more 
interestingly, the Court held that even if the subsidiary’s California 
contacts were imputable to Daimler, Daimler still would not be subject 
to general jurisdiction there.100 
 
 96.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 97.  Id. at 750–51. 
 98.  Id. at 752. The plaintiffs also alleged that Daimler itself had enough contacts with 
California to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over it. The district court rejected that 
argument, and the plaintiffs did not challenge that finding. See id. at 752, 758. 
 99.  Id. at 759 (holding that subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts are imputable to parent 
corporation only when subsidiary “is so dominated by the [parent] as to be its alter ego”). 
 100.  Id. at 760. 
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In some ways, Daimler was another easy case. Neither Daimler 
nor MBUSA was incorporated in California, and neither maintained its 
principal place of business there.101 Moreover, MBUSA’s California 
sales represented only 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales volume.102 But 
the Court’s framing of the issue suggests that the paradigm examples 
of general jurisdiction—except in the rarest cases—will be the exclusive 
means of obtaining general jurisdiction over a corporation.  
For starters, there no longer can be any doubt that “at home” is 
the standard for assessing when general jurisdiction is appropriate.103 
The majority opinion in Daimler used the phrase eighteen times. 
After the Court recounted its earlier general jurisdiction case 
law, including Goodyear, it observed that “general and specific 
jurisdiction have followed markedly different trajectories post–
International Shoe. Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from 
Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to stretch general jurisdiction 
beyond limits traditionally recognized.”104 The last phrase is instructive. 
In the nineteenth century, the “limits traditionally recognized” derived 
from a sovereign’s authority over people and property within its 
borders.105 
The Court then subtly but unmistakably underscored its 
conclusion with a citation to a seminal article by Professors von Mehren 
and Trautman.106 In one passage cited by Daimler, they argue that “the 
sole community where it is fair to require [a corporation] to litigate any 
cause of action . . . is the corporate headquarters—presumably both the 
place of incorporation and the principal place of business, where these 
differ.”107 
Daimler largely made the same point when it discussed 
Goodyear as standing for the proposition that “only a limited set of 
affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-
purpose [general] jurisdiction there.”108 Immediately afterward, in 
 
 101.  Id. at 761. 
 102.  Id. at 752. 
 103.  Cf. Peterson, supra note 45, at 215 (arguing that “it reads too much into Justice 
Ginsburg’s statement [in Goodyear] to suggest that [a corporation’s ‘home’] is the only place in 
which general jurisdiction may be asserted”). 
 104.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58 (emphasis added). 
 105.  See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 141, 149–50 (arguing that, in response to the Supreme Court’s suggestion that a corporation is 
subject to general jurisdiction only in its place of incorporation, states in the nineteenth century 
began to force corporations wishing to do business in the state to “consent” to jurisdiction).  
 106.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.9 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 
1177–79). 
 107.  von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1179. 
 108.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
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describing that “limited set of affiliations” for corporations, the Court 
reiterated what it had said in Goodyear: “the place of incorporation and 
principal place of business are paradigm bases for general 
jurisdiction.”109 
Of course, the mere description of paradigm examples does not 
deem them to be the exclusive places where general jurisdiction is 
appropriate.110 Indeed, Daimler acknowledged as much.111 At various 
points throughout the opinion, though, the Court signaled how little 
room there is for deviation from the paradigm examples. Daimler 
fleshed out the concept of being at home in a state, making plain that a 
corporation must be “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that 
State.”112 Moreover, it explained that only an “exceptional case” would 
justify any deviation from the paradigms and, critically, cited Perkins 
as the quintessential exception to the overarching rule.113 In Perkins, 
the defendant effectively had relocated its corporate operations to 
Ohio.114 The Court’s understanding long has been that Ohio had become 
the defendant’s “principal, if temporary, place of business.”115 Perkins 
thus set the bar exceedingly high—essentially, the functional 
equivalent of a paradigm forum. This presumably is the type of 
situation that Daimler envisioned as the “exceptional case” in which a 
defendant’s affiliations with the forum are “comparable” to those of a 
domestic company. In fact, Daimler went so far as to suggest that 
 
 109.  Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 110.  See Peterson, supra note 45, at 215 (making such an argument about Goodyear’s 
language). 
 111.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to 
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; 
it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”); id. at 761 n.19 (“We do not foreclose 
the possibility that . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of 
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render 
the corporation at home in that State.”). 
 112.  Id. at 758 n.11. Such comparability is not based on an absolute quantum of contacts with 
the state. Otherwise, as Daimler argued, a large corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction 
everywhere because it might have just as many contacts with a state as does a local business that 
operates only in that one state. The Court argued, in contrast to Justice Sotomayor, that a 
“corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id. at 
762 n.20; see also infra notes 132−134 and accompanying text. 
 113.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19. 
 114.  “To the extent that the company was conducting any business during and immediately 
after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it was doing so in Ohio.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011); see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8 
(quoting Goodyear’s understanding of Perkins). 
 115.  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780, n. 11 (1984); see also Daimler, 134 
S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (noting that “Ohio could be considered ‘a surrogate for the place of incorporation 
or head office’ ” (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144)). 
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Perkins might have set the bar so high as to render it a one-off 
situation.116 
Perhaps most tellingly, when the Court actually analyzed 
whether Daimler or MBUSA was at home in California, it trained on 
the fact that neither company was incorporated in California and that 
neither maintained its principal place of business there.117 Full stop. 
The Court offered no further discussion of other ways that the 
companies might have been at home in California. In other words, in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, there will be no occasion to explore 
whether a Perkins-type exception might apply. 
If I am right, one might query, why didn’t the Court state 
directly that general jurisdiction is proper only in a paradigm forum? 
First, the Court in Goodyear and Daimler took pains not to overrule any 
of its precedents. Perkins thus necessitates leaving the door ever so 
slightly ajar. Second, the Court probably did not want to create an 
ironclad rule, lest a corporation manipulate its (technical) principal 
place of business in order to gain a jurisdictional advantage.118 In a 
slightly different context, the Court recognized the need for a modicum 
of flexibility in defining a corporation’s principal place of business for 
that very reason.119 
 
*       *       * 
 
Daimler thus confirmed the most ambitious reading of 
Goodyear. A corporation likely is subject to general jurisdiction only in 
a state where it has incorporated or maintains its principal place of 
business. The Court has left open only the slimmest possibility that 
general jurisdiction might be permissible in a state that is the 
functional equivalent of one of those paradigm examples. While such an 
exception is theoretically possible, the Court suggests that it will be the 
rarest of rarities.120 Just as first-year medical students learn not to 
privilege bizarre diagnoses, lawyers and scholars would do well to heed 
the same adage here: “When you hear hoofbeats, think of horses, not 
zebras.” 
 
 116.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (noting that “Perkins ‘should be regarded as a decision 
on its exceptional facts, not as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general 
jurisdiction’ ” (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144)). 
 117.  See id. at 761. 
 118.  See Borchers, supra note 27, at 137 (arguing for such flexibility in general jurisdiction 
doctrine). 
 119.  See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010) (interpreting “principal place of 
business” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). 
 120.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760, 761 n.19. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SATURATION POINTS AND THE BOUNDS OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
The last three years have witnessed a sea change in the Supreme 
Court’s general jurisdiction case law. Just as remarkable as the extent 
of the change is the level of consensus that the Court has achieved in 
effecting it: Goodyear was unanimous, and the Daimler majority 
opinion commanded eight votes. By contrast, the Court has evinced an 
entrenched division on certain questions of specific jurisdiction. Most 
conspicuously, it has struggled for nearly thirty years to determine 
whether, and to what extent, specific jurisdiction is proper when a 
defendant places a product into the stream of commerce, the product 
moves through a sophisticated distribution chain, and the product then 
causes harm in the forum state. The Court failed to generate a majority 
opinion in 1987 when it first confronted the issue,121 and it seemed even 
more fractured in 2011 when it tried again to resolve the question.122 
Scholars have recognized this strange dichotomy in the Court’s 
treatments of specific and general jurisdiction, a state of affairs that 
reflects the entrenched notion that the two concepts operate 
independently. Indeed, part of the problem in Goodyear was the North 
Carolina courts’ reliance on the analytical tools of specific jurisdiction 
in the general jurisdiction context. But treating the two species of 
personal jurisdiction as independent misses an important 
undercurrent. 
This Part demonstrates that a theory lurks within the Court’s 
consensus on questions of general jurisdiction, a theory that can bridge 
the divide between the two species of personal jurisdiction. In severely 
tightening the standards for general jurisdiction, the Court has brought 
much needed theoretical cohesion to that corner of the doctrine. But 
what is right with general jurisdiction today suggests what is wrong 
with specific jurisdiction. 
Goodyear and Daimler vindicate a distinct vision of personal 
jurisdiction: courts may not exercise their adjudicative power in 
arbitrary ways. But the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law has 
developed layer upon layer of requirements that have little, if anything, 
to do with protecting against arbitrariness. For decades, scholars have 
grappled with the major questions that the specific jurisdiction 
jurisprudence has raised since International Shoe, including the 
 
 121.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 122.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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current approach’s focus on contacts and purposefulness,123 its 
defendant-centric nature,124 and its elusive constitutional source.125 
Amidst the apparent doctrinal chaos, though, there is the germ of a 
coherent theory. Reorienting specific jurisdiction around the 
nonarbitrariness principle that underpins the new general jurisdiction 
holds the possibility of fostering a more cohesive and flexible 
jurisdictional regime. 
A. Two Saturation Points 
As I have discussed earlier, personal jurisdiction originally was 
predicated on what today courts and scholars call general jurisdiction. 
It depended entirely on the relationship between the defendant and the 
forum, even when the lawsuit itself had no connection to the forum.126 
International Shoe introduced a new dimension to the theory—the 
possibility that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on the 
relationship between the lawsuit and the forum.127 Although the latter 
idea was not entirely novel, International Shoe marked the advent of 
an approach that candidly relied on that relationship. In earlier 
decades, courts had incorporated dispute-specific considerations into 
their jurisdictional analyses only by way of legal fictions, such as 
implied consent, that were rooted in the old territorial approach.128 
To conceptualize the two different types of relationships that 
undergird personal jurisdiction analyses since International Shoe, 
imagine the following basic graphic representation. (It looks rather bare 
now, but as the analysis proceeds, it will become more interesting.) The 
x-axis represents the quantity and quality of the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum. This was the traditional dimension of personal 
jurisdiction analysis. By contrast, the y-axis represents the extent of 
 
 123.  See, e.g., Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 89, at 618; Spencer, supra note 34, at 624. 
 124.  See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, 
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (2012); Spencer, supra 
note 34, at 624. 
 125.  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-
Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 574–82 (1995); Borchers, supra note 29, at 87–101; 
Perdue, supra note 124, at 733–39; Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1115–33 (1981). 
 126.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 614–15. But see id. at 618 (noting that through certain 
dispute-specific devices, courts, in fact, “only occasionally decided disputes having absolutely no 
relationship with the forum”). 
 127.  See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text; see also Twitchell, supra note 11, at 625; 
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136. 
 128.  See supra note 18; see also Twitchell, supra note 11, at 621. 
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the lawsuit’s relationship to the forum, the dimension that 




1. The Saturation Point of General Jurisdiction. By definition, 
general jurisdiction is dispute-blind and thus involves no connection 
between the lawsuit and the forum. Accordingly, the y-value for the 
outer boundary of general jurisdiction is “0”; in other words, true 
general jurisdiction is some point along the x-axis. (Of course, if a 
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a forum and there is also 
some level of connection between the lawsuit and the forum, that’s fine. 
But the outer boundary of general jurisdiction must fall on the x-axis.) 
One place where general jurisdiction always existed was at point 
“A,” the farthest right point on the x-axis. This is where a defendant has 
the greatest possible connection to the forum. For an individual, it is 
her domicile;129 for a corporation, the principal place of business or the 
place of incorporation. 
 
 129.  Individuals also may be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum based on personal 
service of process there—so-called transient or “tag” jurisdiction—even when the individual has 
only a minimal connection to the forum. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
Numerous commentators have criticized the rule’s continuing endurance. See generally, e.g., 
Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional 
Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Burnham 
and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1991); Mary 
Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659 (1991). 
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Before Goodyear, the expansive approaches that lower courts 
had taken regarding general jurisdiction located that boundary well to 
the right of the origin on the graph (point “O”) but also well to the left 
of point “A.” As I have described above, some courts held that general 
jurisdiction was appropriate based on a relatively minimal connection 
between the defendant and the forum, such as a certain volume of sales 
in the forum. It’s a guestimate, but call this point “B.” Other courts 
insisted on a higher showing—a more continuous relationship with the 
forum and some sort of physical presence, perhaps even a branch office. 
Call this point “C.” Figuring out where to locate that outer boundary—
whether at “B” or “C” or somewhere in between—did not correspond to 
any well-developed theory of general jurisdiction.130 
In Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court located the outer 
boundary of general jurisdiction at “A.” This is what I refer to as the 
saturation point—the point at which it is impossible for the defendant 
to have more significant contacts with any other forum. My formulation 
of the saturation point allows for different states to assert general 
jurisdiction over an entity—for instance, where the corporation 
maintains its principal place of business and also where it has 
incorporated. Both states are places where the corporation is “at home,” 
albeit in different ways. In some respects, these two paradigm forums 
are incommensurable. It is difficult to say that a corporation is more at 
home in one than in the other. But one can say that the corporation does 
not have more significant contacts anywhere else.131 
This formulation of the saturation point also accounts for the 
slight leeway that Daimler still allows for a case like Perkins, one in 
which general jurisdiction is appropriate in the functional equivalent of 
 
Count me among those who regard transient jurisdiction as an anachronism that is inconsistent 
with modern approaches to jurisdiction, including the theory developed here, and should remain 
the stuff of truly terrible movies. In that vein, never, ever see SERVING SARA (Paramount Pictures 
2002). 
 130.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 684 (calling general jurisdiction a “theoretical wasteland”). 
 131.  In many ways this is an attempt to discern the corporate equivalent of an individual’s 
domicile. That concept will include a corporation’s principal place of business, which, while often 
readily discernible, sometimes presents a tricky question. For purposes of the diversity jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012), the Supreme Court has created a bright-line rule: a 
corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center,” which in almost every instance will 
be the corporation’s headquarters. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). In the 
personal jurisdiction context, the inquiry into a corporation’s principal place of business is probably 
more flexible even though, in most cases, it also will point to the “nerve center.” Moreover, unlike 
in the context of § 1332, it is possible—if highly unlikely (and slightly oxymoronic)—for a 
corporation to have more than one principal place of business for purposes of personal jurisdiction. 
The chief candidate for this idea is probably the Boeing Company, which in 2001 moved its 
headquarters to Chicago, Illinois, but still maintains extensive operations in Seattle, Washington. 
I am skeptical whether Boeing is still subject to general jurisdiction in Washington, but I 
acknowledge that Boeing presents an anomalously close call. 
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a paradigm forum. In Perkins, the lawsuit commenced when the 
defendant was directing corporate operations from its temporary 
principal place of business in Ohio. Consequently, at that moment in 
time, the defendant was not more at home anywhere else. 
Moreover, this understanding of the saturation point suggests 
that identifying where a corporation is at home depends on more than 
an analysis of the total quantum of contacts that the defendant has with 
the forum.132 Even if a corporation has deep and significant contacts 
with a particular place, the relevant question remains whether the 
defendant has more significant contacts elsewhere. Such an approach 
captures the unique relationship between a defendant and the place (or 
limited number of places) where it truly is at home. In the wake of 
Goodyear, some commentators advocated this approach,133 which the 
Daimler majority clearly—and, to my mind, correctly—adopted.134 
For decades, the idea of shrinking general jurisdiction to the 
paradigm examples seemed little more than an academic pipe dream.135 
The last four years, though, have seen just such a momentous shift, 
which actually might lead the way to a more coherent understanding of 
how personal jurisdiction, writ large, should operate. 
2. The Saturation Point of Specific Jurisdiction. As the Court has 
confined general jurisdiction to the saturation point along the x-axis, 
Goodyear and Daimler raise the intriguing possibility of a second 
saturation point, one along the y-axis. Courts and scholars long had 
been aware that point “A” on the graph was one possible boundary of 
general jurisdiction, even if most believed that the boundary should lie 
somewhere to the left of “A.” But scholars and American courts have not 
yet explored the possibility of a saturation point of specific jurisdiction. 
The idea behind a saturation point along the y-axis is that there 
is a point at which the connection between a lawsuit and the forum is 
so tight that a particular defendant actually does not need to have any 
connection to the forum. To borrow a phrase, when the lawsuit itself is 
“at home” in the forum, a state may entertain that lawsuit. In exercising 
 
 132.  Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
judgment) (arguing that general jurisdiction turns on “the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state 
contacts, not the relative magnitude of those contacts in comparison to the defendant’s contacts 
with other States”); Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 742 (arguing that courts “should not treat 
defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they carry on more substantial business in 
other states”). 
 133.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 694; Stein, supra note 6, at 537–38. 
 134.  See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. 
 135.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 656–57; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 676; von Mehren & 
Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144, 1179. But see Twitchell, supra note 50, at 171–72 (expressing a 
“change of heart” and suggesting a more expansive approach to general jurisdiction).  
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jurisdiction, the state does not act arbitrarily, notwithstanding the 
defendant’s limited or nonexistent relationship to the state. 
This saturation point is more theoretical than real. In fact, 
imagining such a case is almost impossible. If a lawsuit is inextricably 
connected to the forum, any given defendant is likely to have some 
connection—however tenuous, unintentional, or insubstantial—to the 
forum. For this reason, the saturation point, identified as point “D” on 
Figure 1, probably does not actually touch the y-axis, even though it 
moves as close as possible to the axis.136 
There actually is no need to stretch one’s imagination to find a 
real or convincing case, though. The concept of a saturation point along 
the y-axis is more of a thought experiment. But the idea inheres in the 
very concept of specific jurisdiction. Scholars who fleshed out the theory 
of specific jurisdiction—including its provenance and its purpose—
implicitly recognized that it does not depend on any relationship 
between the defendant and the forum. Instead, specific jurisdiction, in 
its purest form, depends only on a connection between the lawsuit and 
the forum.137 
This notion derives in part from one of the principal insights of 
International Shoe and its progeny, which focused on the 
reasonableness of asserting specific jurisdiction.138 International Shoe 
itself had no occasion to explore the outer limits of specific jurisdiction. 
The defendant had a significant affiliation with the forum,139 and the 
connection between the lawsuit and the forum was also tight.140 Thus, 
in Figure 1, International Shoe probably falls somewhere around point 
“E.” Nonetheless, the case reflected a clear conceptual shift away from 
 
 136.  Perhaps the situation that comes closest to this concept is when a plaintiff brings a 
lawsuit that is truly at home in the forum but mistakenly sues the wrong party, which has no 
connection to the forum. Today, such a defendant could move to dismiss the claim for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Under the theory developed here, the 
defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction but, instead, could bring an early motion to 
dispose of the claim on the merits. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (motion for summary judgment). I am 
grateful to Heather Elliott for suggesting this example. 
 137.  See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 627 (“Under [its] original definition[ ], . . . specific 
jurisdiction was based on the relationship between the forum and the dispute being litigated.”); 
see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136 (“[A]ffiliations between the forum and 
the underlying controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues 
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”).  
 138.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 320 (1945) (noting reasonableness 
of assertion of specific jurisdiction); see also, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–
23 (1957) (noting that the centrality of events in California made California a reasonable forum). 
 139.  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313–14 (noting that defendant employed salesmen and 
regularly engaged in business in forum). 
 140.  See id. at 311–12 (noting substantive claim for unpaid unemployment taxes incurred in, 
and owed to the government of, the forum). 
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the idea that courts should have to pigeonhole all assertions of personal 
jurisdiction into the old territorial framework that looked solely at the 
relationship between the defendant and the forum. Instead, jurisdiction 
could be reasonable when the lawsuit arose in the forum. 
The entire concept of the y-axis suggests a saturation point, even 
though the Court thus far has been reluctant to recognize it. In the 
years since International Shoe, the Court’s specific jurisdiction 
jurisprudence has grown increasingly restrictive.141 Contrary to my 
hypothesis above, the Court has repeatedly insisted that a defendant 
always must demonstrate some level of connectedness to the forum142 
and that the defendant’s contacts with the forum must be purposeful 
rather than merely fortuitous.143 Moreover, the question of what exactly 
counts as a purposeful affiliation with a forum has been a source of 
great consternation and has divided the Court for years.144 In other 
words, while the theory of specific jurisdiction—and a concern for the 
connection between a lawsuit and the forum—suggests a saturation 
point, the current jurisprudence has not embraced the full breadth of 
the theory. 
European courts probably have come closest to realizing the 
notion of a saturation point along the y-axis. Under the Brussels I 
Regulation,145 personal jurisdiction in the European Union focuses in 
large part on the connection between the underlying lawsuit and the 
forum.146 For example, under Article 5(3) of Brussels I, specific 
jurisdiction147 is appropriate in torts cases “where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur.” This provision is unconcerned with whether the 
defendant has intentionally directed or targeted its activities toward 
the forum;148 instead, it looks primarily to the locus of the lawsuit. 
Similarly, Article 6(2) permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over third-
party defendants who are connected to the litigation but not necessarily 
 
 141.  See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 27, at 130. 
 142.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
 143.  See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–88 (2011); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–98. 
 144.  The stream-of-commerce cases offer the most vivid illustration of the conundrum. See 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 145.  Council Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (“Brussels I”).  
 146.  See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1050 (2006) 
(“[E]ach of the [Brussels I] provisions on specific jurisdiction is justified by the close connection 
between the dispute and the court called upon for its resolution.”); see also Willibald Posch, 
Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other Alternatives: The Effects of Jurisdictional 
Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 363, 368–69 (2004). 
 147.  In European civil procedure parlance, “special jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Brussels I, supra 
note 145, art. 5. 
 148.  Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–98 (insisting on purposeful affiliation). 
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the forum itself. Thus, when a French company sued its various French 
insurers in French court, the defendants were able to join a Spanish 
insurer as a third-party defendant, even though the Spanish insurer 
otherwise had no connection to France. The indemnification proceeding 
was centered in France, and jurisdiction, therefore, was appropriate 
over all potentially liable insurers, including the Spanish defendant.149 
Although the European approach comes closest to what I 
envision, it does not exactly correspond to the notion of a saturation 
point. For example, the provision regarding third-party joinder does not 
insist that the original proceeding be in the forum where the lawsuit is 
most at home. Instead, the plaintiff has latitude to choose a forum as 
long as that choice “does not amount to an abuse”150 or reflect a bare 
desire to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in a foreign court.151 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice has insisted that the third-
party action must still have some connection to the original proceedings 
before the forum court.152 In other words, the saturation point of specific 
jurisdiction along the y-axis, as I have conceived it, is probably more 
demanding than Brussels I in insisting on the best and tightest 
connection between the lawsuit and the forum. And because the 
saturation point, as a theoretical matter, is concerned only with that 
relationship, it does not formally insist on any connection between the 
defendant and the forum. 
B. The Germ of a Theory 
By situating the outer boundary of general jurisdiction at one 
saturation point, the Court rationalized the case law regarding that 
species of personal jurisdiction. It also tapped into a coherent theory 
that can provide a way out of the personal jurisdiction morass. 
The two saturation points that I have described represent the 
constitutional boundaries at two extremes. These points are instructive 
 
 149.  Case C-77/04, Groupement d’intérêt économique Réunion européenne v. Zurich España, 
Société pyrénéenne de transit d’automobiles (Soptrans), 2005 E.C.R. I-4509, I-4534 (“Soptrans”). 
The European Court of Justice found that there was “a sufficient connection between the original 
proceedings,” i.e., the French company’s lawsuit against its French insurers, “and the third-party 
proceedings” against the Spanish insurer. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 36. 
 150.  Id. ¶ 36. 
 151.  See Brussels I, supra note 145, art. 6(2) (authorizing jurisdiction over third-party 
defendants as long as plaintiff did not choose original forum “solely with the object of removing 
[the defendant] from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case”). 
 152.  See Michaels, supra note 146, at 1050 (citing Soptrans, 2005 E.C.R. I-4509, ¶36) (“[T]he 
Court . . . restricts the jurisdiction of [Brussels I] for third-party proceedings to cases in which 
there is a ‘sufficient connection between the original proceedings to support the conclusion that 
the choice of forum does not amount to an abuse.’ ”). 
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precisely because they reveal when a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction even in the absence of one of the relationships. Put another 
way, the saturation points demonstrate exactly why the relationships 
captured by the different axes should be independently meaningful. At 
the same time, the saturation points are truly exceptional. Through 
their exceptionalism, they reveal why the modern approach to personal 
jurisdiction typically insists that a court should have some connection, 
however minimal, to both the lawsuit and the particular defendant. 
Consider first the relationship represented by the x-axis—that 
of the defendant with the forum. Locating the boundary of general 
jurisdiction at the saturation point captures an essential notion about 
legitimate state power. To avoid exercising power arbitrarily, a forum 
usually must have some relationship to both the lawsuit and the 
defendant. Therefore, in most situations, a state acts arbitrarily when 
it exercises power over a defendant regarding a case that has no 
connection to the forum. The one exception—and thus the one 
circumstance in which such exercise of power is not arbitrary—is when 
the defendant is truly at home in the state. 
The Court in Daimler recognized that whether a defendant is at 
home in the forum does not depend simply on the magnitude of a 
defendant’s contacts with the state. That aspect of the analysis is 
critical and correct. For ease of analysis, imagine a natural person—
say, a Silicon Valley tech magnate billionaire whose domicile is in 
California but who maintains a vacation home in Montana. Such a 
person might own more property in Montana and invest more in the 
Montana economy than most Montanans. Why should that billionaire 
not be subject to general jurisdiction in Montana? To my mind, the 
answer turns on notions of consent and submission.153 
In a meaningful sense, natural persons choose their domicile. It 
is the sovereign to which they owe a certain fidelity and to which they 
have submitted for certain regulatory purposes. For example, the state 
of people’s domicile has the power to tax their income based solely on 
their residency there (even if most people don’t exactly celebrate that 
fact).154 That state also has the power to determine when driver’s 
licenses expire and what people have to do to renew them. And, 
critically, it is the community in which people vote and choose the 
leaders who will create the rules that govern their everyday lives. While 
the California billionaire might pay property taxes in Montana and 
otherwise establish ties with the state, he is not truly at home there, in 
 
 153.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 547. 
 154.  See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932) (“[D]omicile in itself 
establishes a basis for taxation.”). 
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the sense of having consented to be a member of the community for all 
purposes, including voting and being subject to myriad regulations. 
Admittedly, the Californian has not literally consented to pay taxes, 
serve on a jury, or be sued in any particular instance. But he has 
actually chosen California as his home as well as the bundle of rights 
and responsibilities that attend that choice.155 
Although the notion of consent is somewhat ethereal, it 
expresses why the billionaire is amenable to personal jurisdiction 
regarding any lawsuit in California but not in Montana. That idea of 
being at home in the forum is what distinguishes California’s ability to 
assert general jurisdiction and thus makes such an exercise of power 
nonarbitrary. 
The same concept holds true with respect to the relationship 
between the lawsuit and the forum. Usually a court would act 
arbitrarily if it claimed jurisdiction over a defendant who had no 
connection with the forum. But an exception to the usual rule applies 
when the relationship between a lawsuit and the forum is so strong that 
no other state could claim a more significant connection to the lawsuit. 
In such cases—at the saturation points—the exercise of state power 
becomes nonarbitrary. At those points, a state can overcome the 
presumption that it should have a connection to both the lawsuit and 
the defendant. 
Other scholars have recognized the nonarbitrariness principle 
that undergirds personal jurisdiction.156 In fact, it encapsulates the 
essence of what due process protects: a defendant’s interest in not being 
subject to arbitrary assertions of power. Professor Spencer has argued 
persuasively that the prohibition against arbitrariness explains why 
true general jurisdiction is permissible only at what I call the saturation 
point along the x-axis.157 While critical, that is only half the battle. The 
other saturation point identifies the converse boundary, and only by 
identifying both points can an analysis reveal the full range of options 
between them. 
Of course, points “A” and “D” in Figure 1 are not the only 
instances in which personal jurisdiction is permissible. But the 
saturation points essentially bookend the analysis. In so doing, they 
 
 155.  As noted above, the enduring concept of transient jurisdiction is inconsistent with this 
vision of how general jurisdiction should operate with respect to natural persons. See supra note 
129. 
 156.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 634, 636; see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 90 (arguing 
that state assertions of personal jurisdiction need survive only rational basis review); Borchers, 
supra note 125, at 577–79 (same). 
 157.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 656. 
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give content to the nonarbitrariness principle that ultimately is the 
touchstone of personal jurisdiction analysis. 
One facet of nonarbitrariness is an underlying concern about 
state sovereignty.158 The Supreme Court has vacillated over the years 
about whether and to what extent state sovereignty figures into the 
personal jurisdiction calculus.159 Although many scholars have argued 
that such sovereignty concerns are vestiges of an outmoded way of 
thinking,160 recent commentary has emphasized the subtle but 
important role that sovereignty still plays.161 
The idea is part intuition, part political theory. Imagine, for 
example, a New York defendant who lives in northern Manhattan. 
Without traffic, the Superior Court in Hackensack, New Jersey, is a ten- 
or fifteen-minute drive just across the George Washington Bridge from 
the defendant’s home.162 By contrast, the state courthouse in Brooklyn, 
New York—not just in the defendant’s home state, but in his home 
city!—is twice as far away. The intuition is that state boundaries still 
matter, even when a New Jersey court is more convenient than a 
particular courthouse in New York City. That intuition in turn captures 
the theoretical point about how someone is a member of a polity that 
chooses its leaders and organizes its judicial system. Consequently, 
state boundaries do not simply serve as a proxy for convenience but rest 
on fundamental notions about the definition of political and judicial 
power.163 
Sovereignty thus remains deeply embedded in notions about 
whether a court acts arbitrarily or nonarbitrarily. But despite the 
constitutive role that it plays in defining judicial power, it does very 
 
 158.  See id. at 639. 
 159.  Compare, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) 
(invoking interstate federalism as part of personal jurisdiction analysis), and J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) (same), with Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982) (describing personal jurisdiction as 
a protection of individual liberty rather than of state sovereignty), and Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (same). 
 160.  See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for 
the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 75–87 (1984); Daan Braveman, 
Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533, 540–54 (1982); Redish, 
supra note 125, at 1113–15, 1120–21. 
 161.  See Feder, supra note 50, at 687–88; Perdue, supra note 124, at 739; Stein, supra note 6, 
at 536–37, 542–43. 
 162.  Assuming, of course, that “traffic studies” aren’t impeding progress over the bridge. 
 163.  Not everyone will share this intuition. Professor Redish, for example, argues that 
personal jurisdiction should turn exclusively on questions of fairness and convenience. See Redish, 
supra note 125, at 1137–42. But a theory of personal jurisdiction that completely ignores the 
relevance of state boundaries must have some explanation for why state courts and perhaps even 
states themselves continue to exist as anything other than convenient (and sometimes terribly 
inconvenient) administrative units. 
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little analytical work in answering specific questions. State sovereignty 
does not meaningfully contribute to an analysis of, for example, 
whether a state may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
whose product harms a forum resident. As Professor Perdue has 
explained, sovereignty “is simply the label we apply to whatever judicial 
authority is granted to the states. . . . [It] is what is left at the end of 
the analysis, rather than the starting point.”164 
State sovereignty helps explain why the personal jurisdiction 
analysis depends on the two relationships expressed by the axes in 
Figure 1. In that vital sense, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the 
nonarbitrariness principle. It means that contrary to the suggestions of 
some scholars, courts at least are asking the right overarching 
questions about the relationship between the forum and the defendant 
and the relationship between the forum and the lawsuit. The 
importance of those relationships reveals why personal jurisdiction is 
not simply a doctrine of convenience. At the same time, sovereignty does 
not specify exactly where the outer boundaries of personal jurisdiction 
should lie. As I have argued, the notion of the saturation points makes 
progress toward answering the latter question by fleshing out the 
nonarbitrariness principle. The following section turns to the question 
of where else the exercise of judicial power is appropriate. 
C.  The Bounds of Personal Jurisdiction 
1. Abandoning Thresholds. Personal jurisdiction obviously can 
exist at places other than the two saturation points. In fact, there is a 
vast middle ground between them where the exercise of jurisdiction is 
permissible. Since International Shoe, though, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has treated personal jurisdiction as a binary proposition 
based on certain thresholds; that is, a defendant may qualify for general 
jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. 
At present, the case law relies on these thresholds and, in turn, 
creates the jurisdictional lacunae discussed in Part II. With respect to 
general jurisdiction, once a defendant has amassed enough contacts 
with a forum, she has crossed a threshold and is amenable to 
jurisdiction in that particular state regarding any claim. The precise 
threshold had remained somewhat mysterious until Daimler. For ease 
of graphic representation, though, assume an older vision of general 
jurisdiction in which the threshold was lower than it is today. The 
vertical line at point “X” in Figure 2 below represents that threshold. 
 
 164.  Perdue, supra note 124, at 739. 
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Everything to the right of the line is an area in which general 
jurisdiction is permissible. 
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, has required two 
thresholds. First, it insists on a certain level of “minimum contacts” 
between the defendant and the forum,165 a much lower threshold than 
the connection necessary for general jurisdiction. This is the vertical 
line at point “Y.” Second, specific jurisdiction also has required a fairly 
tight connection between the lawsuit and the forum. The Supreme 
Court’s formulation over the years has required that the lawsuit “aris[e] 
out of or relate[ ] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”166 Those 
are actually quite different standards, as lower courts have recognized 
over the years.167 The precise level of connectedness does not matter for 
purposes of the present analysis. Instead, the point is that the Supreme 
Court and lower courts typically have treated the required nexus as a 
threshold. Although it might vary in accordance with different 
formulations, I have located this threshold at point “Z.” Consequently, 
current jurisprudence permits specific jurisdiction in the area to the 




 165.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 166.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 
 167.  See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 318–20 (3d Cir. 2007) (exploring 
different levels of connectedness between lawsuit and forum necessary for specific jurisdiction); 
see also, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the First, 
Second, and Eighth Circuits follow a stringent “proximate cause” test); Shute v. Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (requiring 
“but-for” causation); Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Grp. Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (requiring “substantial connection”). 
 168.  Figure 2 is based on a diagram suggested by Professor Richman. See William M. 
Richman, Part I—Casad’s Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part II—A Sliding Scale to Supplement 
the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1341 (1984) 
(book review). Although his diagram accurately depicts the Court’s current jurisprudence in most 
respects, Professor Richman does not take account of the fact that the Court has not countenanced 
the exercise of jurisdiction in the area to the left of the line at point “Y.” 
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Figure 2 
 
One of the principal conclusions from this Article is that, 
contrary to the current case law, the outer boundary of personal 
jurisdiction is not dichotomous. Instead, it exists along a continuum 
between the two saturation points that I have described. Thirty years 
ago, Justice Brennan rejected the idea that personal jurisdiction is 
rigidly binary,169 and other scholars have explored the idea of a sliding 
scale.170 Professor Richman has noted: “As the extent and importance 
of defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between 
the claim and the defendant’s contacts should be permissible; as the 
extent and importance of defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a 
stronger connection between the claim and defendant’s contacts should 
be required.”171 
Despite offering a very useful conceptualization of a sliding 
scale, Professor Richman and others remained tethered to the idea of 
thresholds. Their concern focused on marginal cases that didn’t quite 
qualify for specific or general jurisdiction, represented by the no-man’s 
 
 169.  See Helicol, 466 U.S. at 425–28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that while plaintiffs’ 
cause of action did not arise out of defendant’s forum contacts, it was significantly related to those 
contacts). 
 170.  See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests 
Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34–38 (1984); Richman, supra note 29, at 615–16; 
Richman, supra note 168, at 1338–45. 
 171.  Richman, supra note 29, at 615. 
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land in Figure 2.172 In other words, they sought to bridge the widening 
gap between specific and general jurisdiction as the Court had 
developed those concepts.173 Moreover, Professor Richman’s idea of a 
sliding scale between the current notions of specific and general 
jurisdiction would still lead to the conclusion that a defendant is not 
amenable to jurisdiction in a state with which she has not established 
a sufficient degree of purposeful contact. In fact, he viewed the sliding 
scale as opening the jurisdictional door to “only a small fraction” of the 
cases in which jurisdiction is presently impermissible.174 
As discussed more fully below, the nonarbitrariness principle 
suggests a continuum that permits jurisdiction in far more instances 
than would the current case law or even Professor Richman’s sliding 
scale. Reorienting personal jurisdiction around the notion of 
nonarbitrariness suggests that the Constitution probably permits 
nearly every attempt to exercise specific jurisdiction that the Supreme 
Court has considered since International Shoe. 
The better view of the outer limits of personal jurisdiction is a 
true continuum between the saturation points. A conceptualization of 
personal jurisdiction that relies on thresholds and then seeks to fill 
resulting gaps does not correspond with a robust theory of how 
sovereignty and nonarbitrariness actually define the boundary of 
permissible jurisdiction. The saturation points and the continuum 
between them do just that, and in a way that abandons any need to 
define thresholds. Not only does this approach offer a more theoretically 
satisfying notion of personal jurisdiction, but on a practical level, it also 
relieves courts of the need to define exactly where those thresholds for 
specific jurisdiction are. As alluded to above, such questions have vexed 
courts for decades.175 
2. The True Continuum. The remaining question, then, is what 
path the continuum traces between the saturation points. Although one 
could imagine various shapes, in all likelihood the curve representing 
the outer boundary of personal jurisdiction is a severely concave curve. 
A court may assert personal jurisdiction at all points along the curve 
and to its right, but jurisdiction is impermissible in the relatively small 
 
 172.  This, in fact, is the zone that Professor Richman represents in his diagram. See Richman, 
supra note 168, at 1341. 
 173.  See id. at 1345 (arguing that sliding scale should “supplement[ ]” existing conceptions of 
personal jurisdiction); see also Borchers, supra note 27, at 138 (“[W]e need to build a bridge 
between general and specific jurisdiction.”); Lewis, supra note 170, at 34 (“Although the Court has 
not subscribed expressly to blending claim-related and nonclaim-related contacts, its decisions 
certainly do not foreclose that approach.”). 
 174.  Richman, supra note 168, at 1344 n.62. 
 175.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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region to the left of the curve. Figure 3 adds this curve to Figure 1, 
which sketched the two basic relationships and identified where certain 
cases might fall. This vision of how personal jurisdiction should operate 





This is not a precise mathematical representation but rather is 
conceptual. The basic idea is that although the saturation points 
require an incredibly tight connection between the defendant and the 
forum when there is no relationship between the lawsuit and the forum 
(and vice versa), the standard becomes much more lax once both 
relationships are present to at least some degree. This approach 
corresponds with the nonarbitrariness principle that long has been at 
the heart of constitutional due process. Once a forum has some 
connection to both the defendant and the lawsuit—even if those 
connections are minimal—there is little risk that the forum will act 
arbitrarily if it exercises personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
In fact, the starting point of the modern approach to personal 
jurisdiction usually assumes that both relationships should be present. 
When they are, the Constitution almost always authorizes a court to 
exercise jurisdiction. The converse is also true: when one of the 
relationships is absent, the Constitution usually forbids jurisdiction. 
For those reasons, a court’s exercise of jurisdiction based only on the 
existence of one relationship will be an exception to the overarching 
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rule, one which is justified only when that single relationship is so tight 
as to reach the saturation point. The severely concave slope of the curve 
thus derives from the nonarbitrariness principle.176 Admittedly, this 
approach reorients the personal jurisdiction doctrine, but it is more 
faithful to the underlying tenets of the procedural guarantees that the 
Due Process Clauses embody. Many scholars have argued that the 
current personal jurisdiction doctrine more closely resembles a 
substantive due process analysis, as it presently focuses on “the fairness 
of the underlying result, rather than with the mechanism used to get 
there.”177 But the constitutional boundaries of a court’s power to hale a 
defendant into court more logically should protect procedural fairness—
the means by which a court compels a defendant’s appearance. Those 
questions remain antecedent to concerns about substantive fairness, 
which arise only at a later stage in the litigation. 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated what the 
nonarbitrariness approach to personal jurisdiction might look like in 
practice. It would rely, in nearly every respect, on the standards by 
which the Court assesses the propriety of a state’s choice-of-law 
decision. For choice-of-law purposes, the Court has held that a 
particular state’s substantive law may govern a dispute as long as the 
dispute has “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts” 
with the state, “such that choice of [that state’s] law is neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair.”178 In that context, the nonarbitrariness 
approach accords significant deference to a state’s choice of a particular 
body of substantive law. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
has proved equally deferential to the manner in which one state applies 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 
129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889))); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that 
procedural due process includes right “to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that procedural due process includes right to notice). 
 177.  David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1987); see also, e.g., Borchers, supra note 29, at 90 n.469; Stephen 
Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on 
International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 976–87 (1995); Wendy Collins 
Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer 
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508–10 (1987); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, 
Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 572–77 (2007). 
 178.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“It may be assumed that a choice-
of-law decision would violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were 
fundamentally unfair to either litigant.”) (emphasis added); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 814–23 (1985) (reiterating Allstate standard but holding that Kansas substantive 
law could not govern when ninety-nine percent of leases and ninety-seven percent of plaintiffs had 
no connection to Kansas). 
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a sister state’s substantive law.179 An analogy to the constitutional 
standards governing choice-of-law decisions thus suggests how personal 
jurisdiction should operate. 
To recognize that the Court in many respects has already 
created the blueprint for a nonarbitrariness principle is not to overlook 
a jurisprudential oddity. When it comes to a state’s decision about 
which substantive law to apply to a dispute, the current constitutional 
standards are notoriously undemanding—that is, subject only to review 
for arbitrariness. But on the question of whether the state can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the standards are much more 
exacting. Justice Black noted this anomaly in Hanson v. Denckla,180 in 
which he argued that Florida substantive law could govern the dispute 
despite the majority’s holding that Florida could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a Delaware defendant.181 For many years scholars 
have argued that, if anything, the approaches to personal jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law are backwards. A court’s power to subject a defendant 
to particular substantive rules arguably merits greater scrutiny than a 
court’s power to hale that defendant into court.182 Some scholars have 
advocated a more robust and stringent test in the choice-of-law 
realm,183 while others have suggested that both issues—personal 
jurisdiction and choice-of-law—should be subject to the same 
deferential standard.184 Either way, commentators largely have 
reached consensus that the standards governing personal jurisdiction 
should not be more stringent than those that apply to choice-of-law 
decisions. 
I hesitate to wade too deeply into the choice-of-law realm or 
critique its nuances here. In fact, the utility of applying the 
nonarbitrariness principle in the jurisdictional context does not depend 
on whether the same test should continue to govern choice-of-law 
 
 179.  See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988): 
To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause, 
it is not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our 
cases make plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that 
is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s attention. 
 180.  357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 181.  See id. at 258–59 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 254 n.27 (majority opinion) 
(reserving judgment on whether Florida substantive law could apply). 
 182.  See James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879–
80 (1980); Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 
(1978); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 782 (arguing that a court’s legislative 
jurisdiction—the power to apply substantive law—is narrower than a court’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction). 
 183.  See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1251–66 (2011). 
 184.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 658–60. 
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questions. But the basic intuition underlying the Court’s deferential 
approach regarding the selection of substantive law seems especially 
apt in the personal jurisdiction realm. As Professor Spencer has argued, 
the procedural due process concerns in both contexts protect against 
arbitrariness.185 While he correctly resists a “facile” equation of the two 
analyses, he notes that they often will point in the same direction.186 
Figure 3 reflects the idea that an appropriate focus on due process 
concerns about arbitrariness will countenance most assertions of 
personal jurisdiction when the forum has some connection, even when 
quite limited, with both the defendant and the underlying dispute.187 
D.  The Way Forward 
I have argued that locating true general jurisdiction at the 
saturation point along the x-axis in Figures 1 and 3 holds the promise 
of resolving a host of other problems. In concluding this Article, I offer 
three essential lessons that courts can glean from the developments 
described here. 
First, the saturation points elucidate how certain modes of 
analysis can ensnarl the jurisdictional calculus. For example, when the 
Supreme Court in Nicastro188 held that the defendant was not amenable 
to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey, where the defendant’s product 
harmed the plaintiff, the plurality drew on language and analyses that 
define one saturation point. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion spoke 
of ascertaining whether the defendant had “submitted” or “consented” 
to jurisdiction in the forum.189 At one point, the opinion formulated the 
specific jurisdiction inquiry as training on whether the defendant had 
“manifest[ed] an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”190 
Justice Ginsburg chastised the plurality for trying to 
reinvigorate notions of “consent” that International Shoe and its 
progeny had discarded as legal fictions.191 That’s mostly right. Insofar 
as she was speaking about the fact that consent is largely irrelevant to 
specific jurisdiction analyses, she was absolutely correct (and, in 
fairness, the sole question in Nicastro pertained to specific 
 
 185.  Admittedly, the choice of substantive law might also implicate substantive fairness 
concerns. 
 186.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 658–60. 
 187.  See Borchers, supra note 29, at 89–90 (arguing for deferential approach to state 
assertions of personal jurisdiction based on nonarbitrariness principle). 
 188.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 189.  See, e.g., id. at 2788–89 (plurality opinion). 
 190.  Id. at 2788. 
 191.  See id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdiction).192 Nevertheless, consent is still a meaningful concept 
when identifying the saturation point at which true general jurisdiction 
exists. I have argued that point “A” in Figures 1 and 3, in locating the 
place where a person and an entity are truly at home, relies on what 
Professor Stein has called “bona fide consent.”193 At that point, natural 
persons and entities have truly chosen their home. But at any other 
point along the continuum, notions of consent are indeed fictional, as 
Justice Ginsburg argued. The plurality’s mistake, then, was importing 
an analysis that applies only at the saturation point for general 
jurisdiction into the rest of the jurisdictional analysis. 
The concepts that define the two saturation points are 
appropriately strict. They ferret out the tightest possible connection 
between the forum and the defendant, on one hand, and the forum and 
the lawsuit, on the other hand. But the strictness of the analysis in 
identifying those two points—“A” and “D” in Figure 3—belies the 
tremendous leeway that exists almost everywhere else along the 
continuum. 
The second lesson, a corollary of the first, is that despite the 
strictness of the saturation points, constitutional due process is much 
more forgiving when the forum has a connection to both the defendant 
and the lawsuit. Such latitude suggests that the Constitution probably 
approves almost every exercise of specific jurisdiction that the Supreme 
Court has deemed to be problematic. 
To illustrate how the nonarbitrariness principle liberalizes 
personal jurisdiction, consider the recent Nicastro case in which the 
defendant had taken steps to market an industrial shearing machine 
throughout the United States. One such machine moved through the 
usual distribution chain, wound up in New Jersey, and seriously 
injured the plaintiff there.194 The defendant had a mild but relevant 
connection to New Jersey because the defendant sought to serve the 
entire United States, including New Jersey, through the usual flow of 
its products through the distribution chain. Moreover, the connection 
between the lawsuit itself and New Jersey was quite strong. 
Accordingly, the nonarbitrariness principle makes the stream-of-
commerce cases like Nicastro relatively easy from a constitutional 
perspective. 
 
 192.  A defendant may actually consent to personal jurisdiction once a lawsuit has begun or in 
advance (through a forum selection clause). But the difficult specific jurisdiction inquiries do not 
involve just express consent. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy cast those questions in terms of 
implied consent or submission. See id. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion).  
 193.  See Stein, supra note 6, at 547; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 194.  Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion). 
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The same is true in World-Wide Volkswagen. Although the local 
New York retailer had conducted no business in Oklahoma, the retailer 
sold the automobile that ultimately caused significant harm in 
Oklahoma.195 Admittedly, the connection between the defendant and 
the forum is even weaker than in Nicastro because the New York 
retailer had not intended to serve the Oklahoma market. But that 
connection is probably enough, particularly because the epicenter of the 
litigation was in Oklahoma—the accident took place there, the 
plaintiffs were hospitalized there, and nearly all of the relevant 
evidence was there. 
Or consider the Helicol case, which involved a lawsuit in Texas 
against a Colombian defendant regarding a helicopter crash in Peru. 
Although the Court did not directly consider whether specific 
jurisdiction was appropriate,196 evaluating the case from that angle is 
instructive. In passing, the Court expressed skepticism whether specific 
jurisdiction would have been appropriate,197 and Professor Richman has 
articulated a similar ambivalence about whether his proposed sliding 
scale would allow jurisdiction.198 Under a nonarbitrariness approach, 
though, jurisdiction is clearly proper. There was a nontrivial connection 
between the defendant and the Texas forum as well as between the 
lawsuit and the forum. The defendant had purchased eighty percent of 
its helicopter fleet from Texas and sent many of its pilots to Texas for 
training,199 including the pilot whose alleged negligence caused the 
crash in Peru.200 Even without the fairly tight causal connections, the 
extent of both relationships suggests that specific jurisdiction over the 
defendant in Texas would have been far from arbitrary. 
Other commentators have reached the same basic conclusion: 
nearly every personal jurisdiction case that the Supreme Court has 
considered since International Shoe probably complies with the 
nonarbitrariness principle.201 But the concept of saturation points 
 
 195.  See 444 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1980). 
 196.  The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s regular contacts with Texas came 
nowhere close to satisfying the standards of general jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–18 (1984). Moreover, the Court did not directly consider 
the question of specific jurisdiction because the parties had conceded that the defendant’s contacts 
with Texas did not give rise to the claim. Id. at 415–16 & n.10. 
 197.  See id.; see also id. at 418 n.12. 
 198.  See Richman, supra note 168, at 1345 n.63. 
 199.  Helicol, 466 U.S. at 411. 
 200.  Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 201.  See Borchers, supra note 125, at 577–78 (arguing that assertions of specific jurisdiction 
that the Supreme Court invalidated were not, in fact, arbitrary and thus should have passed 
constitutional muster); see also James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial 
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 255 (2004) (arguing that under 
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grounds that conclusion in a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction 
that explains the proper scope of both general and specific jurisdiction. 
Moreover, this approach also points the way toward a true specific 
jurisdiction—the idea that jurisdiction can be proper based solely on a 
tight connection between the forum and the lawsuit itself. 
The third lesson might be somewhat surprising in light of the 
second. Because of the incredibly lax constitutional standard for 
personal jurisdiction between the saturation points, the Supreme Court 
acts appropriately when it crafts common-law limitations on courts’ 
power.202 If I and others are correct in our assessment of the limited 
restraint that the Constitution offers,203 there is the potential for courts 
to exercise personal jurisdiction in inconvenient204 and intuitively 
(though not unconstitutionally) unfair ways. That which is lawful is not 
always beneficial or edifying.205 Or, as Justice Stevens has put the point 
in the choice-of-law context, the Constitution gives states plenty of room 
to adopt “unsound” policies.206 
At the federal level, litigants and courts already have several 
tools at their disposal to ameliorate some of these problems. These 
include venue provisions,207 the power to transfer cases to a more 
convenient forum,208 and the ability to dismiss cases based on the 
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens.209 While these and 
similar tools at the state level address many concerns about 
convenience and general fairness to the litigants, new problems arise 
frequently. For instance, in the Internet context, does a virtual 
company expose itself to personal jurisdiction everywhere in the United 
States unless it takes affirmative steps to withdraw from certain states? 
Does it matter whether the company is a large multinational 
corporation or a small mom-and-pop operation? And what happens 
 
an arbitrariness standard “every assertion of state court jurisdiction considered by the Supreme 
Court since it introduced the minimum contacts test in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 
would easily pass muster”). 
 202.  Professor Borchers, who has embraced my second conclusion, draws a diametrically 
opposed lesson from the laxness of the constitutional standards that govern specific jurisdiction. 
He views the Constitution’s permissiveness as an invitation for states to experiment. See Borchers, 
supra note 29, at 103–04. 
 203.  See Borchers, supra note 125, at 577 (calling the Constitution a “weak check” on personal 
jurisdiction); see also Weinstein, supra note 201, at 255. 
 204.  See Spencer, supra note 34, at 632 (arguing that inconvenience hardly ever rises to the 
level of unconstitutionality). 
 205.  See 1 Corinthians 10:23–24. 
 206.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 331–32 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 207.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1390, 1391 (2012). 
 208.  See id. §§ 1404, 1406. 
 209.  See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30 (2007). 
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when a defendant has engaged in intangible activity (say, operating a 
website) and allegedly caused intangible harm (say, infringing a 
protected trademark)?210 
In an ideal world, Congress would act to address novel concerns, 
as it has done in important respects through venue and transfer 
provisions. Within the loose personal jurisdiction doctrine described 
above, Congress has the power to provide more rigorous protections.211 
That is probably desirable. But if Congress does not act, the appropriate 
solution is not simply to allow states to exercise personal jurisdiction 
subject only to a demonstrably weak constitutional check.212 
Like Congress, the Supreme Court also has the power to 
articulate prudential limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
Even after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins famously declared that 
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”213 federal courts still retain 
the power to craft a more modest, specialized form of common law.214 
This new federal common law is narrower in scope (as it governs only 
unique areas of federal concern)215 and broader in effect (as it now 
creates law that also binds state courts).216 Professor Monaghan argues 
that one species of the new federal common law is a “constitutional 
 
 210.  A coauthor and I attempt to address these questions and craft a concrete approach in 
light of the theory developed here. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 211.  Several scholars have argued that Congress has direct power to control state courts’ 
jurisdiction over persons. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 29, at 104–05 (locating such power in both 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause); Weinstein, supra note 201, at 279 
n.408 (locating such power in the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Other scholars have suggested 
that Congress might have only an indirect power to regulate at least some state assertions of 
personal jurisdiction. Because Congress may regulate how states accord full faith and credit to one 
another’s judicial proceedings, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, if a state court in State A fails to comply 
with congressional directives, Congress can prevent federal courts and the courts of sister states 
from recognizing any judgment rendered by State A’s courts. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, How 
Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1326 n.153, 1347 (2014). 
 212.  Cf. Borchers, supra note 29, at 103 (arguing that the Supreme Court should get “out of 
the business of regulating personal jurisdiction” and “throw the matter back to the states”). 
 213.  304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 214.  For example, on the same day that the Supreme Court decided Erie, it created federal 
common law, coincidentally in a decision also authored by Justice Brandeis. See Hinderlider v. La 
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
 215.  Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 383, 405 (1964). 
 216.  See id.; Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 10 (1975); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 897 (1986) (“Although at one point there was some doubt, it is now established 
that a federal common law rule, once made, has precisely the same force and effect as any other 
federal rule. It is binding on state court judges through the supremacy clause.”). By contrast, pre-
Erie federal common law created law only for the federal courts. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal 
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1268 (1996). 
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common law,” which is inspired, but not compelled, by the 
Constitution.217 In his formulation, two hallmarks characterize 
constitutional common law. First, it is interstitial. Usually it articulates 
a remedial or procedural rule to operationalize a given constitutional 
provision that, without guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, 
would remain ineffectual.218 Second, because the specific common-law 
rule is not actually constitutionally compelled, it is subject to revision 
by Congress.219 
In a creative and thorough examination of the source and nature 
of personal jurisdiction rules, Professor Weinstein builds on Professor 
Monaghan’s insights and argues that nearly all of the limits on personal 
jurisdiction qualify as constitutional common law.220 Since the early 
years of the republic, the bounds of personal jurisdiction have usually 
derived from such common law rules.221 In crafting those rules then and 
now, the Supreme Court gives effect to the structural concerns 
embedded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause as well as Congress’s 
implementing legislation.222 Critically, though, whenever the Court 
exercises this power to promote a perceived need for national 
uniformity,223 those common-law rules are always subject to 
congressional tweaking.224 In these situations, “[t]he Court, in effect, 
opens a dialogue with Congress.”225 
All of this suggests that the actual constitutional standards 
governing personal jurisdiction are quite lax and that additional 
restrictions are often desirable. But the space for prudential or quasi-
constitutional innovation concerns only the area between the two 
saturation points, as the saturation points are already subject to 
rigorous standards. These are situations in which a court hales a 
foreign defendant into a forum where that defendant is not at home. 
Precisely because out-of-staters might be subject to the various whims 
 
 217.  Monaghan, supra note 216, at 9, 28, 36. For example, the classic Miranda warning is a 
prophylactic rule that seeks to effectuate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Fifth Amendment does not 
actually compel this rule, which is simply one way to operationalize the overarching privilege. See 
Monaghan, supra note 216, at 20. 
 218.  See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 18–20. 
 219.  See id. at 27–30. 
 220.  See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 173–74, 255, 265.  
 221.  See id. at 175–81; see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 23 (noting that, until the end of 
the nineteenth century, federal common law defined the contours of personal jurisdiction in federal 
court). 
 222.  See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 283–90. 
 223.  See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 12–13. 
 224.  See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 278, 288. 
 225.  Monaghan, supra note 216, at 29. 
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of state courts, the need for nationwide uniformity and predictability is 
paramount. Experimentation by the states, especially if they are 
inclined to exploit the tremendous latitude the Constitution gives them 
to bring foreign defendants into their courts, seems undesirable.226 In 
many instances, Congress is the best institution to adopt such 
policies.227 But if Congress does not or cannot respond expeditiously,228 
the Court has the power, which it has always exercised, to craft 
prudential rules when the Constitution otherwise would allow states to 
exercise their discretion haphazardly. 
My argument suggests that while the saturation points are 
constitutionally compelled, including the newly tightened parameters 
of general jurisdiction, the vast majority of the other limitations on 
personal jurisdiction are probably prudential. An evaluation of the 
wisdom of those prudential limitations is beyond the purview of this 
Article. Nonetheless, a proper understanding of which limits are 
constitutional and which are prudential will enable a more productive 
conversation between the Supreme Court and Congress. The Court acts 
appropriately when it seeks to address modern problems and craft 
sensible limits on the bounds of courts’ power over litigants. But the 
Court should make clear which of those doctrines are prudential and 
thus subject to reformation by the political branches. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Within the Supreme Court’s virtual unanimity on the question 
of general jurisdiction lies the hope of a coherent and unified theory of 
personal jurisdiction, one rooted in procedural due process and the 
notion of nonarbitrariness. The Court has identified the saturation 
point at which general jurisdiction is appropriate—where the 
connection between the defendant and the forum is as tight as possible. 
It also has implied the existence of another saturation point. The two 
points together help define the outer constitutional limits of personal 
jurisdiction. Although the boundary that traces its way between the two 
saturation points suggests a lax constitutional regulation of personal 
jurisdiction in most instances, I have argued that that laxness also 




 226.  See Borchers, supra note 27, at 122 (noting prevalence of state long-arm statutes that 
expressly—or through judicial construction—extend as far as the Constitution allows). 
 227.  Weinstein, supra note 201, at 282. 
 228.  See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 28. 
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constitutional notions become suppler, Congress and the Supreme 
Court can work cooperatively and creatively to fashion sensible 
prudential limits on courts’ adjudicative powers. 
 
